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I
INTRODUCTION
There is wide variation in the activity and influence of the nearly two dozen
international courts (ICs) currently in existence. What factors lead some ICs to
become active and prominent judicial bodies that cast a rule-of-law shadow
beyond the courtroom, while others remain moribund or legally and politically
sidelined? This introduction brings together experts of different ICs from the
disciplines of law, political science, and sociology to collectively evaluate how
institutional, political, and social contexts, and other exogenous factors
influence the authority of ICs.
We are interested in when a court’s formal legal authority evolves into
authority in fact, or de facto authority. A key contribution of this introduction is
the development of a framework to assess IC authority in fact that can be
measured and assessed over time, across issue areas, in different countries, and
in a disaggregated fashion. The contributors to this symposium, covering the
major issue areas in which ICs operate, apply the authority metric to ten of the
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most active ICs. Our primary goal in explicating this framework is to create a
metric for assessing how legal, political, and social factors shape whether an IC
has any de facto authority, the scope of that authority, and whether that
authority encompasses the full range of its delegated jurisdiction.
Part II analyzes the distinctive features of ICs as international institutions.
We identify similarities common to all ICs and explain how ICs differ in
important ways from other international institutions and from domestic courts.
Part III defines IC authority and develops a framework that permits
scholars to assess differences in authority in fact, within and across courts.
Building on earlier scholarship, we create a measure of authority that reflects
the practices—that is, the words and actions—of different sets of actors or
audiences, who range from the litigants in a specific case to a broader legal field
of, for example, attorneys, government officials, and scholars. This part also
explains our decision to put aside questions of actors’ motives and beliefs, thus
separating authority in fact from both sociological legitimacy and normative
legitimacy.
This symposium focuses on how contextual factors that are largely beyond
the control of international judges facilitate or hinder whether an IC has any
authority in fact and, if so, the extent of that authority. Accordingly, Part IV
identifies a range of institutional, social, and political factors that shape IC
authority. Part IV also previews how the contributors to this symposium
analyze these contextual factors as applied to different ICs. Some of our
contributors also consider the ability of judges to influence these contextual
factors.
Part V introduces a third dimension—IC power and effectiveness. We
consider how far an IC’s authority extends across the full range of its subject
matter competence and the states subject to its jurisdiction. Some ICs establish
authority that is capacious in one sense—the number of actors who accept an
obligation to comply—but confined in another sense—the acceptance exists
only for a narrow issue area or a few countries. So long as a court’s authority is
limited in this way, its political and legal shadow remains relatively small. An IC
becomes more powerful and influential when its authority expands not only to a
wider circle of constituencies, but also across a broader range of legal issues and
countries.
Part VI concludes by summarizing the major findings of this issue and by
identifying promising avenues for future research.
II
ICS AS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACE DISTINCT
CHALLENGES
Our analysis of the authority of ICs engages with a growing literature on
international authority that focuses on global governance institutions or that
imports domestic concepts about institutions and legal processes into the
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international realm. We not only build upon this literature, but also explain
how ICs possess legal authority that differs in fundamental ways from that of
other international institutions and from that of domestic courts. We begin by
identifying how these differences create distinctive challenges for establishing,
2
maintaining, and building IC legal authority.
In the most general terms, legal authority is a form of power characterized
by a content-independent response to a command or order. The response is
content-independent because the command is not tailored to the recipient’s
interests. Legal authority is more complex than parental authority, but it is
similar in that subjects comply because an authoritative actor has said what
3
conduct is required. Most ICs acquire formal legal authority—what many call
4
de jure authority—through an act of delegation from states that establishes a
court’s formal right to rule on disputes falling within its jurisdiction. The legal
right to rule exists even if the moral or ethical basis of that right remains
contested.
Many scholars assert that ICs possess unquestioned authority simply by
virtue of this act of delegation. Although delegation confers formal powers on
ICs and specifies their functions in important ways, delegation alone is
insufficient. A formally constituted court may receive no cases even if violations
of the law under its jurisdiction are widespread. Or it may issue decisions that
the parties ignore or that have no legal or political impact. The core challenge
that ICs face, therefore, is transforming formal legal authority into authority in
fact, also known as de facto authority.
The distinctive structures and functions of ICs shape how this
transformation occurs. ICs “pre-exist the question that is to be decided,” in that
judges are selected “through a mechanism that does not depend on the will of
5
the litigating parties.” International judges also “sit on the body’s bench and
decide a series of cases,” and their competence “derives from a public mandate
6
[whose] outcome is, in essence, a public good.” Whereas diplomats strive for
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. Romano, Alter, and Shany state that ICs include six essential features:
1. international governmental organizations, or bodies and procedures of international
governmental organizations that . . . 2. hear cases where one of the parties is, or could be, a
state or an international organization; 3. are composed of independent adjudicators, who . . . 4.
decide the question(s) brought before them on the basis of international law . . . 5. following
pre-determined rules of procedure, and . . . 6. [that] issue binding decisions.
Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany, Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues
and Players, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1, 6 (Cesare Romano,
Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].
3. See Andrei Marmor, An Institutional Conception of Authority, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238–40,
240 n.3 (2011).
4. Observers may differ over the precise boundaries of an IC’s jurisdiction, but most agree that
the act of delegation confers upon a court a circumscribed power to rule on disputes that fall within its
jurisdiction. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of Delegation, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2008 (discussing limits on international delegations).
5. Romano, Alter & Shany, supra note 2, at 5.
6. Id. IC decisions are public goods in the sense that they further public goals.

INTRODUCTION_12-19 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/16/2016 11:17 AM

[Vol. 79:1

political compromise and arbitrators typically broker sustainable deals between
the parties to a dispute, international judges are put in place to decide cases
based on the reasoned interpretation and application of international law. In
addition, international judges must consider how their decisions will be
understood not only by today’s litigants, but also by potential future litigants
7
and other legal actors who may be affected by their rulings.
These considerations distinguish courts from nonjudicial institutions. Most
adjudication involves a plaintiff asserting a legal wrong and a defendant who is
allegedly responsible for that wrong. The judges respond to the parties’ claims
by speaking what the law requires, that is, by assessing competing legal
arguments, clarifying ambiguities, labeling violations, and perhaps specifying a
remedy. The contrast between ICs and other international bodies is striking.
Few expect the UN Security Council to deliberate, vote, or adopt legal edicts in
the ways that domestic legislatures do. Yet government officials, lawyers, civil
society groups, and actual or potential litigants expect ICs to act like domestic
courts in the sense of following predetermined rules of procedure and justifying
their decisions on the basis of legal reasoning and argumentation. These
similarities suggest one way for ICs to convert formal legal authority into
authority in fact—by emulating their domestic counterparts and cultivating a
constituency of legal professionals who act as litigants, scholars, judges,
activists, politicians, and businessmen.
Yet there are also important differences between national and international
courts that may impede the transformation of an IC’s authority from de jure
authority to authority in fact. ICs are often new institutions. As such, their
rulings may conflict with, and seek to displace, well-established or assumed
interpretations of legal rules or social norms. Displacing entrenched ideas and
practices is always difficult. For international judges, doing so is especially
challenging because ICs operate in a context of multiple authoritative
decisionmakers. Formally, most ICs are the highest judicial interpreters of the
international rules within their respective jurisdictions. In practice, however,
other international and domestic legal and political actors may compete over
their respective jurisdictions and over the meanings of legal texts.
Domestic legal systems also have multiple levels of governance, but there is
8
usually a shared understanding about which actors have the final word. In the
United States, for example, federal legislative power coexists with state and
local power, but established rules and procedures determine when state law
must give way to federal law, and vice versa. ICs, by contrast, operate within a
7. KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS
8–10 (2014) [hereinafter NEW TERRAIN].
8. See generally, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD (2009) (discussing the
issue of multiple authorities as a focus of debates over legal pluralism and legal polycentricity); Liesbet
Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance, 97
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233 (2003) (discussing a range hierarchical and non-hierarchical multi-level
governance forms).
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context of international regime complexity that features “nested, partially
overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically
9
ordered.” This lack of a clearly established hierarchy arises because states often
draft new treaties and create new institutions without specifying their
relationship to preexisting ones, and because many treaties give national
10
governments discretion to decide how to implement international obligations.
The result is that multiple actors within nested and parallel regimes can
plausibly claim supremacy over overlapping legal domains.
The plurality of authoritative institutions and decisionmakers also shapes
the understandings and expectations of domestic audiences. There are many
reasons that ICs may fail to meet these understandings and expectations.
Lawyers, government officials, NGOs, and academics often have deeply held
ideas about national sovereignty, the place of international law in national legal
orders, and the content of international rules. Some of these actors may not
understand an IC’s formal authority, may see IC rulings as strange and foreign,
or may believe that IC rulings have no domestic legal effect. Divergences in
legal practices among member states complicate this picture, because an IC’s
choice of one national practice or creation of a hybrid practice may introduce
unfamiliar concepts to audiences in other countries. As entrenched as these
ideas and practices may be, they must sometimes be displaced before domestic
audiences will accept an IC’s de facto authority. The essential point linking
these examples is that actors can insist that they respect the rule of law and, at
the same time, disregard IC rulings by relying on competing authoritative legal
interpretations.
III
THE VARIABLE AUTHORITY OF ICS
This part explains how we ascertain IC authority in fact, operationalizing the
concept by reference to the practices of different audiences that interact with
ICs. Our goal is to create a practicable definition that reflects the real world in
which ICs operate. We specify varying types of de facto authority that enable
comparisons within a single court in different issue areas or over time, as well as
between ICs. We conclude by identifying the indicators that we expect to
observe when a court possesses different types of authority in fact.

9. Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP.
13, 13 (2009).
10. To domestic observers, this cacophony may appear as inefficient as it is convoluted. Yet
scholars of international institutions have identified a number of advantages to maintaining this
complexity. Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, for example, argue that a complex of climate
change regimes is actually a better outcome than a single international climate change regime. Robert
O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7
(2011). See also Hooghe & Marks, Unraveling the Central State, supra note 8, at 235–39 (discussing the
benefits of flexible governance models).
ON POL.
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A. The De Facto Authority of ICs
Many scholars analyze ICs by evaluating the particular design features of
courts, by reviewing the quality of their reasoning, or by measuring state
11
compliance with their decisions. In contrast, we assess the de facto authority of
ICs by examining the practices of key audiences. Judges control neither the
sword nor the purse. They cannot coerce litigants or other actors to behave in
particular ways. Instead, ICs issue decisions that identify violations of
international rules and create a legally binding obligation to comply with the
court’s judgments interpreting those rules. Whether such compliance actually
occurs, however, depends upon the responses of the different audiences
12
described in part III.B.
We are interested in the statements and conduct of these audiences. In
particular, we ask whether one or more audiences recognize, by their words,
actions, or both, that IC rulings are legally binding and engage in actions that
push toward giving full effect to those rulings. To facilitate comparisons within
and across ICs, this metric is intentionally simple. While the empirical articles in
the symposium do consider motives and reasons, our metric of authority, which
measures observed practices, is agnostic as to why an audience recognizes a
court’s authority and to the subjective beliefs that underlie that recognition.
Our approach thereby differs from what sometimes is labeled as sociological
legitimacy, which focuses on how actors’ perceptions may legitimize courts or
13
how such perceptions allow courts to justify their practices and power.
Perhaps most importantly, we do not ask whether IC authority is
normatively legitimate. We are not alone in separating authority from
legitimacy. Recent scholarship on international institutions also counsels against
14
conflating the two concepts. We defend this separation on the following
grounds. First, ICs have an express legal competence usually based on a
15
consensual act of delegation from states. For this reason, their legal right to
rule is generally less contentious than that of other international institutions
whose decisions purport to bind states. Second, we seek a straightforward and
measurable yardstick to evaluate how a range of contextual factors shapes de
facto authority of ICs via an analysis of audiences’ practices toward ICs.
11. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of European Style International Courts, 35 West
Eur. Pol. 135, 135 (2012).
12. This approach follows Andrei Marmor and Michael Zurn et al., who ask whether international
institutions meet the empirical condition of actually having authority. See Andrei Marmor, supra note
3, at 252–55; Michael Zurn, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and its
Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69, 74 (2012).
13. See Mikael R. Madsen, Sociological Approaches to International Courts, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 388, 392–93 (discussing the difference between perception and
justification, on the one hand, and practices and authority, on the other).
14. Birgit Peters & Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Turn to Authority Beyond States, 4 TRANSNAT’L
LEGAL THEORY 315, 316 (2013); Marmor, supra note 3, at 238; Zurn, supra note 12, at 70, 73.
15. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, created pursuant to the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, are exceptions to the formal state consent to the act of delegation that establishes an IC.
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Although it is interesting to study subjective motivations and reasons why
actors accept or reject IC rulings, observing practices does not necessarily shed
16
light on this question. Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, we agree with
Peters and Schaffer that
[m]any conceptions of authority link it so closely to legitimacy as to make “legitimate
authority” tautological, and the two notions virtually indistinguishable. However,
embedding legitimacy in the definition of authority may be both analytically and
empirically problematic, especially if you want to theorize how international authority
relates to resistance, mobilization and contestation . . . . First, if legitimacy and
authority are two sides of a coin, then the more authority an institution has, the more
legitimate it must be. This runs counter to experience: sometimes institutions acquire
authority over new issues without necessarily being seen as more legitimate by all
actors. Second, the [conflation of authority and legitimacy] seems to deny the
existence of illegitimate authority—which might seem troubling for both normative
17
and conceptual reasons . . . .

Applying this insight to ICs, we thus recognize that a court can do
everything normative theorists might expect of a legitimate international
judicial body and still not have authority in fact. The converse scenario—
authority in fact, without normative legitimacy—is also possible.
Our measure of de facto IC authority has two key components—(1)
recognizing an obligation to comply with court rulings and (2) engaging in
meaningful action pushing toward giving full effect to those rulings. This is a
conjunctive standard that is assessed by examining the practices of the relevant
18
actors. A simple public statement that a judgment is legally binding is, without
more, inadequate. Equally insufficient is conduct that happens to conform to a
judgment.
For states that are the defendants in most IC litigation, the recognition
element can be either an express statement of intent to comply, or the implied
acceptance that accompanies a government’s decision to implement or give
effect to a court’s judgment. For non-parties, such as civil society groups or
opposition politicians, recognition occurs when actors refer to IC decisions as
legally binding when pushing states to conform to the court’s judgment.
The meaningful action element is more difficult to gauge. For the losing
state, full adherence to an IC judgment is, of course, sufficient. But it is also too
exacting. Many international judicial rulings involve complex issues of law and
policy that implicate different branches or levels of government—executive,

16. Focusing on practices avoids the obvious problem of how to measure subjective perceptions
and motivations that cannot be directly observed. There may well be discrepancies between actors’
internal, subjective views of IC decisions and the externally observable actions taken by, for example,
government officials.
17. Peters & Schaffer, supra note 14, at 334 (discussing Zurn, Binder & Ecker-Ehrhardt, supra
note 12).
18. To reiterate, we are observing behavior—what actors do—without questioning the motivation
or reason for their actions. If an actor demonstrates some recognition of an obligation to comply, the
first criteria is met. We do not inquire into the deeper normative and constitutive forces that may
contribute to this recognition.
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legislative, and judicial; national, state, and local. Coordinating responses
among these multiple actors can be difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes
impossible. In addition, many IC rulings may require social mobilization to be
given full effect. To take account of these complex realities, our framework not
only considers the practices of the litigants but also those of a wider set of
participants in the legal process. For example, actors who are not a party to the
dispute—such as NGOs, bar associations, and scholars—take meaningful action
when they identify the specific steps needed to implement a judgment, or when
they urge governments to change their behavior to preempt future IC litigation.
The response to the 2004 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment in
the Avena case illustrates these complexities and further clarifies our dual
criteria for IC de facto authority. In Avena, the ICJ ordered the United States
to provide “review and reconsideration” of the convictions and sentences of
20
fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row whose consular rights it had violated.
The United States disagreed with the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rights and the remedies the Court ordered. Indeed,
the United States withdrew its consent to ICJ jurisdiction to hear future
21
disputes relating to the Vienna Convention. Yet President George W. Bush
also issued a “memorandum” asserting that “the United States will discharge its
international obligations under [the Avena judgment] by having State courts
give effect to the decision . . . in cases filed by the [fifty-one] Mexican nationals
22
addressed in that decision.”
We view President Bush’s directive to state courts as both a consequential
step toward compliance and a recognition of the ICJ’s authority. We do so
notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court later held that the Avena
judgment was legally binding only at the international level and that the
23
President’s directive was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s decision
prevented all fifty-one Mexican nationals from receiving automatic review and
reconsideration of their convictions and sentences. Nevertheless, a few state
courts and officials have relied on Avena to grant such relief and to commute
24
the death sentence of at least one defendant.
19. See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 508 (2011) [hereinafter Courts
Resisting Courts] (noting inverse correlation between number of branches of government involved in
injunctive order and implementation of IC decision).
20. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America),
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 559, ¶ 121 (Mar. 31).
21. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2005, at A16.
22. Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb.
28, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
23. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008). According to the Supreme Court, only a
federal statute could compel state courts to comply with the ICJ judgment. Id. at 496. The Avena Case
Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008) and other bills introduced to require
compliance have yet to be enacted by Congress.
24. See Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012); see also
Sandra Babcock, The Limits of International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the International Court
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Although the ICJ’s judgment is more than a decade old, we may not have
seen the final act in the Avena saga. The Avena ruling has influenced behavior
beyond the individuals directly implicated by the case. The federal government
has taken steps to improve compliance with the consular notifications by state
25
and local officials. And Congress may yet enact legislation to implement the
ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention, an outcome urged by scholars
and by the Council of Europe that would bring the United States into full
compliance, but without addressing the fact that the convictions of some Avena
26
litigants were not reviewed prior to their execution.
This example nicely illustrates that IC authority can exist notwithstanding
disagreements about compliance among different branches or levels of
government, and even in the face of overt rejections of IC rulings by some
domestic actors. It also highlights the challenges of analyzing IC authority in the
short term. Some will conclude from this discussion that the ICs we view as
authoritative have only minimal legal and political influence. We return to this
issue in part V.
B. IC Authority Assessed by the Practices of Different Audiences
Our framework identifies five types of de facto authority that correspond to
the practices of different IC audiences, which we illustrate with examples from
this symposium. The first type is no authority in fact. Courts with no authority in
fact have formal jurisdiction from the initial act of delegation, but, despite
identified violations, litigants do not file complaints with the IC, and cases that
the court does decide are generally ignored. For example, Gathii finds that the
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) currently has no de facto authority
among businesses, traders, and other economic actors in the East African
Community, an audience envisioned as one of the court’s principal
27
constituencies.
of Justice in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 183, 187–93 (2012) (discussing case law).
25. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS
MANUAL 43 (4th ed. 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNAtrainingresources/CNA
Manual_Feb2014.pdf (instructing federal, state, and local law enforcement officials on actions required
to comply with the VCCR “to ensure that the United States meets its international obligations”).
26. Avena
Case
Implementation
Act
of
2008,
H.R.
6481,
110th
Cong.,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6481; see also Jacob Katz Kogan, ASIL Presidents Call on
Congress to Pass Legislation to Ensure Compliance with the Avena Judgment, INTERNATIONAL LAW
REPORTER (July 18, 2008, 12:42 PM), http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/07/asil-presidents-call-oncongress-to.html; Council of Europe, The death penalty in Council of Europe member and observer
states: a violation of human rights (Jan. 3, 2011) (urging the U.S. Congress to “pass legislation enabling
those Mexican nationals condemned to death without having been provided with the consular
assistance . . . to be retried following the correct procedures”), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=12590&lang=en.
27. Gathii’s conclusion is based on interviews with potential EACJ business interlocutors who
noted widespread violations of EAC economic rules but see the court as unhelpful in addressing these
violations. In Gathii’s view, the lack of final EACJ decisions relevant to private businesses does not
meet our definition of narrow authority. James Thuo Gathii, Variation in the Use of Subregional
Integration Courts between Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of
Justice, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 60–61.
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The second type, narrow authority, exists when only the parties to a
particular dispute take meaningful steps toward compliance with a court’s
ruling. Narrow legal authority meets the minimum conditions for IC authority
in fact—the recognition of a legal obligation and the need for a consequential
response. The court’s authority remains limited, however, because it does not
extend beyond the litigants to the dispute. As Caserta and Madsen explain
regarding the early rulings of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) interpreting
CARICOM law, only the parties to individual cases recognized the court’s
decisions as legally binding and as requiring consequential steps toward
28
compliance.
Narrow authority falls short of what most observers expect of a court—
namely, the ability to cast a larger legal shadow that affects the behavior and
decisions of other similarly-situated actors. A court achieves intermediate legal
authority only when those actors also recognize the two elements of IC
authority described above. The audiences in this intermediate range of
authority include potential future litigants as well as government officials
charged with implementing international rules as interpreted by the court, such
as executive branch officials, administrative agency officials, and judges. This
audience collectively constitutes what Alter labels as an IC’s “compliance
partners”—the actors who have the power to decide whether to comply with
29
international law as interpreted by the IC.
IC influence becomes more politically consequential at this stage. Our
conception of intermediate authority resembles Marmor’s idea of “practical
authority,” defined as the power “to determine, within a certain range of
options, what types of normative change [an international institution] can
introduce, how to make those changes, who is subject to them, often also how to
30
monitor compliance, and how to respond to non-compliance.” Such authority
can exist even if the subject matter of adjudicated cases remains highly
circumscribed. For example, Dickerson explains that the Organization for the
Harmonization of Commercial Law in Africa (OHADA) Court, which
interprets uniform regional commercial laws in West Africa, has intermediate
authority vis-à-vis a subset of firms that operate in the formal economy and
resolve their business disputes before the OHADA Court or in the shadow of
the law as interpreted by the Court.
The third category, extensive authority, exists when an IC’s audience
expands beyond its compliance partners to encompass a broader range of
actors, including civil society groups, bar associations, industries, and legal
academics. ICs with extensive authority consistently shape law and politics for
one or more legal issues within their jurisdiction. This level of authority is

28. Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and Common Law: The
Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and Post-Colonial
Legacies, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 103–08.
29. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 53.
30. Marmor, supra note 3 at 243.
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largely analogous to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of a “legal field”—the space
where diverse actors accept the legal force of the law but may contest the
meaning, legitimacy, and importance of different interpretations of the
31
law. Applied to our object of inquiry, extensive authority is recognized in the
practices of this wider audience. Yet although these actors acknowledge the
court and its rulings as authoritative, they may still contest the precise meaning
of the law.
One version of extensive authority is captured by the “island of effective
international adjudication,” built by the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), in
the intellectual property (IP) issue area. According to Helfer, Alter, and
Guerzovich, the ATJ has extensive authority over IP disputes because the
practices of a wide range of actors—the industries that depend on IP rights; the
businesses that litigate IP disputes; and the lawyers, domestic agencies, national
judges, and legal scholars who specialize in IP—reveal habitual acceptance of
32
ATJ rulings interpreting Andean IP law. Very different examples of extensive
authority are the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of
33
Human Rights (ECtHR), discussed by Kelemen and Madsen in this issue.
These courts consistently shape law and politics across most of their respective
issue area domains and the states parties subject to their jurisdiction. We return
to this topic in part IV.
A final level—one that we do not consider in this symposium—is popular
authority, which exists when recognition of IC rulings extends beyond the legal
34
field to encompass the public in general. Given their relatively young age, new
31. Bourdieu does not argue that legitimacy exists within a legal field. Rather, his primary claim is
that within this field, actors with different interests, viewpoints, and power-endowments struggle to
impose their preferred definition of legitimacy. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology
of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805–53 (1987); Yves Dezalay & Mikael R. Madsen, The Force
of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. AND SOC.
SCI. 433, 435 (2012).
32. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective
International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean
Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2009). In other legal domains within the ATJ’s jurisdiction,
however, the Tribunal has, at best, narrow authority. It has issued far fewer rulings and has failed to
develop relationships with potential litigants and compliance partners. Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J.
Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors: Understanding the Preliminary Ruling
Reference Patterns in the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871, 897–900 (2009).
33. R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 117; Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority of
the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration
and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 141.
34. Constitutional and supreme courts in both Germany and the United States arguably enjoy
such popular authority. There are no studies of IC popular authority using our metrics. Existing studies
focus on the relationship between public opinion and legitimacy, finding that some high courts garner
more positive public feelings than national legislatures or executives. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira,
James L. Gibson & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 343, 343 (1998). For studies of public support for ICs, see generally Erik Voeten, Public Opinion
and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2013); Linda Camp
Keith, Banks Miller & Rachel McGuire, Second-Order Evaluations of the European Court of Human
Rights, 3 J. L. & COURTS 67 (2015).
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ICs are yet to reach the stage where publics understand, let alone recognize, the
authority of ICs. Moreover, the specialized mandates of some courts may limit
the extent to which publics ever recognize IC authority.
Figure 1 illustrates the levels of IC authority that are our primary focus. The
white outer circle represents the court’s de jure authority as specified via a
formal act of delegation. This delegation is a precondition for the existence of
any type of authority in fact. When an IC has no narrow, intermediate, or
extensive de facto authority—that is, when no audience recognizes IC rulings as
obligatory or undertakes meaningful actions that push toward compliance with
the ruling—there would be no shaded circles within the outer white circle.
Figure 1 displays the three levels of de facto authority as nested, suggesting
that a court first gains narrow, then intermediate, then extensive authority. But
as we explain in the discussion that follows, we intend no teleology by this
diagram. The three circles of de facto authority may not be nested; an IC could
have extensive authority but lack narrow and intermediate authority. This is
arguably the case for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and for the
OHADA Court, as discussed by, respectively, Vinjamuri and Dickerson in this
35
symposium. We also accept that IC authority can contract as well as expand—
a prospect that Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig highlight in their study of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body’s “extensive but fragile”
36
authority, and one that Madsen addresses when he discusses recent debates
37
and reforms of the ECtHR.

35. Claire Moore Dickerson, The OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration: Exogenous
Forces Contributing to Its Influence, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 63; Leslie Vinjamuri,
The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,
2016, at 275. Another example of intermediate authority without narrow authority is Ireland’s
modification of its prisoner voting laws in response to a politically contentious ECtHR judgment
against the United Kingdom, which has publicly rejected the judgment and refused to comply.
Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from
LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 83 (2014).
36. Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the
WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 237.
37. Madsen, supra note 33, at 167–75.
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Figure 1: Three Types of Authority In Fact

C. Indicators of IC Authority In Fact
This subpart identifies indicators of whether an IC has narrow, intermediate,
extensive authority, or some combination thereof, using examples from
different courts and types of cases. The empirical articles in the symposium
explore many other indicators. Pinpointing the precise level of authority
matters less for our framework than identifying movement across the types and
variation within and across ICs.
Indicators of narrow legal authority: If the losing party publicly
acknowledges an obligation to comply with an IC ruling, narrow legal authority
is likely satisfied. The requirement for a consequential response is met by taking
some meaningful step in response to the ruling, such as paying compensation,
reviewing or revising challenged laws and policies, reopening judicial
proceedings, and so forth. We leave open the time frame for these actions and
accept that different actors, branches, or levels of government may disagree
38
about what compliance with an IC ruling entails.
Indicators of intermediate authority: IC authority remains narrow if,
notwithstanding compliance in individual cases, there is general disregard for
international rules and few adversely affected actors bother to challenge this
38. For example, in 2014 the ICJ issued judgments against Japan, involving a treaty banning
commercial whaling, and against Chile concerning its maritime boundary with Peru. Political leaders in
both countries publicly professed their intent to comply, albeit gradually, in the case against Chile and
only partially in the suit against Japan. Martin Facklerapril, Japan Plans to Resume Whaling Program,
With Changes to Address Court Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04
/19/world/asia/japan-says-it-will-resume-whaling-off-antarctica.html?_r=0; Ryan Dube, Peru, Chile
Agree to ‘Gradually’ Implement Sea-Border Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304428004579353071019333430.
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noncompliance in court. Evidence that multiple litigants are filing complaints
suggests the beginnings of intermediate authority because it indicates that a
wider group of actors recognizes the IC as a forum to promote their legal rights.
Intermediate authority is solidified when IC rulings influence the behavior
of potential litigants in similar cases. This is indicated by the revision of laws
and practices to preempt litigation as well as a court’s lengthening shadow in
discussions among lawyers and clients. For example, Huneeus explains that
Colombian officials anticipated what the Inter-American Court might rule
regarding an indigenous land rights case, and Colombian judges regularly refer
to Inter-American Court jurisprudence when considering cases involving
39
criminal, family, and administrative law. Scholars have observed similar
40
patterns in the ECJ and the ECtHR.
Indicators of extensive authority: For ICs with extensive authority, one often
finds textbooks and scholarly treatises on IC case law; an established bar that
appears before the court; NGOs using international litigation; and a diverse
range of judges, practitioners, and officials who draw on IC jurisprudence in
their day-to-day activities. Extensive authority is also revealed by the regular
invocation of IC decisions or potential litigation in legal and policy discussions,
with government officials referencing the prospects of IC review as they debate
and develop policy proposals. Extensive authority often requires that an IC
fulfill the requirements of narrow and intermediate authority. But extensive
authority does not require universal acquiescence; it is compatible not only with
the rejection of authority in fact by some litigants but also with resistance to
such authority, a reality that that Vinjamuri discusses in her analysis of the
41
ICC’s authority.
Legal fields are characterized by contestations of ideas and clashes of power
and interests. Indeed, the more an international institution exercises its right to
make collectively binding decisions, the more likely it will engender politicized
42
disagreement. As applied to ICs, this insight may be reflected in the rejection
of narrow or intermediate authority by some litigants for a court that has
otherwise made an indelible mark on a legal field. For example, Shaffer, Elsig,
and Puig explain how a wide range of actors in the legal field of international
trade law—including trade ministry officials, industry associations, law firms,
39. Alexandra Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varied Authority,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 191 [hereinafter Constitutional Lawyers].
40. For examples of states that preemptively modified their laws and policies following rulings
from these ICs against other states that had adopted similar laws and policies, see, for example.,
RACHEL CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION
AND GOVERNANCE 17–23 (2007); Helfer & Voeten, supra note 35, at 81. Regarding the ECtHR,
British authorities already in the 1980s started screening all new legislation for compliance with the
European Convention of Human Rights to avoid new cases in Strasbourg. Mikael Rask Madsen,
France, the UK and “Boomerang” of the Internationalization of Human Rights (1945–2000), in HUMAN
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL
CONTEXT 57, 81 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004).
41. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 281–83.
42. See Zurn et al., supra note 12, at 87–88.
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and scholars—quickly recognized WTO Appellate Body rulings as
authoritative, even as some governments continued to enact domestic laws that
43
unquestionably violate WTO rules. Extensive authority does, however, help
international judges weather even heated contestations about specific rulings,
such as the resistance to the ECJ by Hungary’s increasingly authoritarian
44
government that Kelemen describes.
We asked our contributors to compare the authority of ICs across time,
actors, or the legal domains that fall under the IC’s formal jurisdiction. Table 1
summarizes the comparisons, and the corresponding types of authority. Perhaps
most importantly, Table 1 reveals that IC authority is not static, and that ICs
with extensive authority do not always have narrow or intermediate authority.

43. Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 267–72.
44. Kelemen, supra note 33, at 131; see also Madsen, supra note 33, at 167–75 (discussing the
ECtHR and the challenges it is facing, particularly in Russia).
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Table 1: Comparisons of IC Authority In Fact across Contexts
EACJ

OHADA
Court

CCJ

ECJ

ECtHR

IACtHR

Economic law

Human rights law

No authority in fact

Emerging extensive authority absent
intermediate authority

Formal economy

Informal economy

Narrow, intermediate, and extensive
authority at a thin elite level

No authority in fact

Founding period (2005–2010)

Recent period (2011–2014)

Narrow authority for CARICOM cases;
intermediate authority for appeals of
national rulings.

Emerging intermediate and extensive
authority for CARICOM cases and
appeals of national rulings

Pre-enlargement EU (1970s–1990s)

Post-enlargement EU (2000–present)

Narrow, intermediate, and extensive
authority

Authority continues, but recent decrease
of narrow authority in few new accession
states

Cold War Era (1950s–1989)

Post–Cold War Era (1990–2014)

Narrow and intermediate authority

Narrow and intermediate authority;
Extensive authority may be retracting in
some member states

Colombia

Chile

Narrow, intermediate, and extensive
authority

Narrow and intermediate authority
Venezuela
Narrow authority to no authority in fact

ICJ
(vis-à-vis
Islamic law
states)

WTO

Territorial disputes

Diplomatic immunity disputes

Narrow authority in litigated cases

No authority in fact

GATT era

WTO era

Narrow authority

Narrow, intermediate, and extensive
authority alongside growing fragility
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ICC

International
Criminal
Tribunals
(ICTs)

Self-referrals

Security Council & proprio moto referrals

Extensive authority without
intermediate authority; spotty narrow
authority

Extensive authority without intermediate
or narrow authority

Nuremberg Tribunals

International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia

Narrow alongside growing
intermediate authority

17

Narrow authority and some intermediate
authority
International Criminal Court
Extensive authority alongside declining
narrow and intermediate authority

IV
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT SHAPE IC AUTHORITY
We next turn to the contexts in which ICs operate. We are interested in how
a range of contextual factors beyond the immediate control of judges influence
the creation, expansion, or dissipation of IC legal authority. In particular, we
ask how different contextual factors enable some courts to gain different levels
of authority, whereas others with similar or different access rules, mandates,
and supporters have no authority in fact, remain static, or even experience
contractions in authority.
The discussion is divided into three analytically distinct categories.
Institution-specific context captures features that are distinctive to a particular
IC, such as its design and subject matter mandate. These features most often
vary across courts, but there may also be variation within a single IC over time
or across issue areas. Constituencies context analyzes issues related to IC
interlocutors, including government officials, judges, attorneys, legal experts,
and civil society groups. Global, regional, and local political context considers
how political dynamics at these different levels affect IC authority. Given that
the empirical articles in this symposium all analyze complex processes
concerning multiple types of authority and specific levels of audiences and
politics, our discussion is only illustrative rather than exhaustive and points to
the overlap and interdependence across different categories of context. We first
review the contextual factors in each category and then briefly consider how IC
judges themselves may seek to influence these contextual factors.
A. Institution-Specific Contexts
Institution-specific contextual factors relate to a single IC and may impact
the ways in which audiences relate to that court. We focus in particular on
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access rules and jurisdiction, alternatives to international litigation, and
variations in subject matter mandates. Although distinctive to particular courts,
these factors often vary across and within ICs in ways that may enhance or
impede connections with different audiences.
1. Access Rules and Jurisdiction
The first permanent ICs were interstate dispute settlement bodies created to
45
adjudicate conflicts between states with the consent of both parties. This
model of international adjudication—what Alter has labeled “old style” ICs—
allows only states to initiate litigation, often only for a specific case or
46
controversy. Old-style ICs today occupy a less prominent place in international
adjudication than they did in previous decades, but they remain an important
venue for some countries and in some issue areas, as illustrated by Powell’s
comparison of the differing authority of the ICJ—the canonical old-style
47
court—in territorial and immunity disputes involving Islamic law states.
Beginning after World War II, and accelerating at the end of the Cold War,
states created new-style ICs whose compulsory jurisdiction is often a mandatory
48
component of a treaty regime of which the court is an integral part. It is more
difficult to block litigation when an IC has compulsory jurisdiction.
Negotiations are thus more likely to take place in the shadow of adjudication,
increasing the bargaining leverage of plaintiffs whose claims are supported by
the law. Additionally, because plaintiffs can initiate litigation without the
express consent of states, we expect ICs with compulsory jurisdiction to be
busier. To the extent that the losing parties respect IC rulings against them,
compulsory jurisdiction may help ICs gain narrow authority. Such jurisdiction
may even be necessary for intermediate and extensive authority.
Multiple access points, especially for nonstate actors, are another hallmark
of new style ICs. This design innovation was first introduced with the creation
of the ECJ and the ECtHR, two European courts that have since served as
models for economic and human rights courts in other regions. For the ECJstyle ICs, access points include preliminary references from lower and apex
national courts, direct access by private parties, and the investigation and
pursuit of complaints by commissions or secretariats. For the ECtHR-style
tribunals, private litigants must first exhaust domestic remedies and then file
international petitions, either directly with the IC or via the intermediary of a
human rights commission. In addition, in both models states can, although

45. Mary Ellen O’Connell & Lenore VanderZee, The History of International Adjudication, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 42, 55–58.
46. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 83.
47. Emilia Justyna Powell, Islamic Law States and the Authority of the International Court of
Justice: Territorial Sovereignty and Diplomatic Immunity, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at
209.
48. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 81–85; Cesare P. Romano, From the Consensual to the
Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 791, 808–11 (2007).
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seldom do, initiate litigation against other countries alleging breaches of the
49
relevant international agreements.
Multiple access points expand the opportunities for ICs to acquire all three
levels of authority in fact. When only governments choose whether to file suit,
the decision to litigate is often influenced by political and diplomatic concerns
50
unrelated to the merits of a case. In addition, multiple access points allow
nonstate actors—such as private litigants, supranational commissions, or
prosecutors—to use IC litigation to circumvent domestic legal blockages. As a
result, disputes that governments and national judges might prefer to handle
quietly behind closed doors or reserve for future bargaining are more likely to
see the light of day. Litigating these cases also allows ICs to “gain[] political
capital from a growing caseload by demonstrably performing a needed
51
function.” The emergence of this positive feedback loop may be an indicator
that an IC is developing intermediate authority.
The importance of access rules and jurisdiction is revealed when
governments restructure ICs, widen their subject matter jurisdiction, or increase
the number of state parties. A number of articles in this issue investigate the
effect of IC design features and design changes. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig
compare the many blockages to dispute settlement under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the WTO panels and Appellate
Body, demonstrating that the GATT system struggled to develop narrow
authority whereas the WTO system almost immediately gained extensive
52
authority. Vinjamuri compares ICC cases referred by the UN Security Council
to self-referrals by states and finds that the mode of referral neither enhances
53
nor hinders the ICC’s narrow authority in the case at hand.
2. Alternatives to International Litigation
Although wider access rules and jurisdiction are likely to increase the flow
of cases to court, the existence of attractive alternatives to international
litigation may siphon away cases and diminish opportunities to build
connections to litigants and other audiences. The attractiveness of these
alternatives varies widely across ICs. The more attractive the alternatives, the
fewer cases a court is likely to receive and the less likely it can establish any
level of authority in fact.
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation, negotiation,
49. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 87–94.
50. David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law,
79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 779 (1994) (“Notwithstanding a meritorious legal claim . . . , one State may be
reluctant to initiate a third-party dispute settlement process against another State for fear of
jeopardizing other strategic or economic bilateral relationships.”).
51. Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution:
Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 482 (2000); see also Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization
and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUDIES 147, 157 (1999) (discussing how switching
from dyadic to trilateral dispute adjudication fuels norm creation).
52. Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 241–55.
53. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 280–86.
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mediation, and arbitration, often offer appealing alternatives to international
adjudication because they are generally faster, less formal, less expensive, and
allow the parties to choose the decisionmakers and whether the decisions
54
should be made public. These alternatives can accomplish litigant objectives,
but their use can hinder the ability of ICs to gain de facto authority by
interpreting legal rules and issuing public, reasoned assessments of the litigants’
competing claims.
The attractiveness of litigation alternatives may also depend upon whether
the party most likely to file suit is a state, a commission or prosecutor, or a
private party. States involved in multiple disputes and policy negotiations may
have greater room to negotiate out-of-court settlements. Private actors often
have less bargaining leverage than public actors, but they too may have viable
alternatives to IC litigation. Private actors may pursue cases in domestic courts
or use political connections to broker a favorable resolution of disputes. For
example, Gathii finds that such alternatives are the primary reason that
businesses do not turn to the EACJ to challenge violations of East Africa
55
Community free trade rules. If, however, domestic courts are sympathetic to
governments or if private parties lack political connections, international
adjudication may be the only viable option.
A different type of alternative exists for disputes that can be litigated before
56
more than one IC. The ability to forum shop may enhance a plaintiff’s
negotiating leverage by allowing him or her to select a court that is more likely
to rule favorably. The existence of multiple venues may also make it more
57
difficult for any single IC to establish narrow or intermediate authority. In
addition, prospective litigants and compliance partners may be wary of
interacting with or shaping their behavior in response to an IC when other
tribunals can opine on the meaning of the same or similar international rules
58
but reach a different result.
3. Subject Matter Competence
All other things equal, ICs have more opportunities to gain authority in fact
when alternatives to litigation are few, the demand for international
54. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION 46–106 (1992).
55. Gathii, supra note 27, at 45–54.
56. Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 289 (1999).
57. For example, maritime boundary disputes tend to be adjudicated by the ICJ, depriving the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea of opportunities to develop its authority in this area. In
addition, states sometimes relitigate cases decided in the MERCOSUR and NAFTA dispute settlement
systems before WTO panels and the Appellate Body. See Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduard Salles, Forum
Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) concerns, (Im)Possible solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 77, 77–79 (2009). In Africa, suits relating to Senegal’s refusal to prosecute or extradite former
Chadian President Hissein Habré have been filed before the African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights, the ECOWAS Court, and the ICJ. See Sangeeta Shah, Questions Relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 354–56, 355 n.22 (2013).
58. Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L.
411, 440–44 (2008).
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adjudication is high, or both situations exist simultaneously. The attractiveness
of these alternatives and the demand for litigation are likely to vary with the
59
subject matter of the cases that an IC can hear.
For some issue areas there may be overlapping and conflicting legal rules or
multiple legal and political venues in which litigants can pursue their objectives.
For example, Gathii, Caserta and Madsen, and Dickerson suggest that
economic actors may have more alternatives to choose from, including political
or informal means of resolving disputes. In contrast, Huneeus’s analysis of the
changing political climate in Latin America suggests that the options to remedy
human rights violations are more limited. During the era of military
dictatorships, and in Venezuela more recently, the Inter-American system was a
plausible venue in which to pursue human rights complaints. Yet in countries
with vibrant neoconstitutionalist movements, domestic judges and government
officials often cite Inter-American rulings against other states to justify changes
in their own laws and policies, preempting regional litigation and giving the
60
IACtHR intermediate authority. For international criminal law, the goal of the
international criminal system is to generate alternatives to ICC adjudication.
Yet as Vinjamuri suggests, a lack of faith in the ICC may generate alternatives
61
to ICC litigation that undermine a court’s authority.
Another way that subject matter may affect IC authority relates to the
political salience of disputes. The dockets of some ICs are dominated by
technical or low-politics cases primarily of interest to specialized groups of
litigants, lawyers, and experts. ICs that adjudicate disputes about the ownership
of patents, such as the ATJ, or the terms of private commercial contracts, the
OHADA Court for example, may find it easier to gain narrow, intermediate,
and extensive authority because few actors beyond the relevant specialized
community scrutinize or contest their rulings. In contrast, ICs may have more
difficulty gaining any de facto authority for high-politics disputes, such as those
involving military force or systemic human rights abuses, because a wide range
of actors, such as executive branch officials, are watching the court and have the
incentive and the means to challenge rulings contrary to their interests.
Combining these institution-specific factors reveals a potential paradox. In
low-politics cases, including many disputes over international economic rules,
ICs may more easily achieve narrow or intermediate authority. Yet the
abundance of alternatives available to address the concerns of businesses and
lawyers can deprive ICs of cases needed to generate even narrow authority. For
issue areas in which the political stakes are higher, in contrast, an IC may be the
only available venue to raise legal violations, a reality that both attracts

59. Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in Global Order, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 212 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi
eds., 2012).
60. See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203, 1218–26 (2011).
61. Vinjamuri, supra note 35 , at 282–83.

INTRODUCTION_12-19 (DO NOT DELETE)

22

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/16/2016 11:17 AM

[Vol. 79:1

complainants yet also makes it more challenging to establish IC authority with
respondent states.
B. IC Constituencies and Their Varied Interests
We next explain how different constellations of constituencies can assist or
impede ICs from gaining narrow, intermediate, and extensive authority. We
begin by disaggregating the state into key sub-state actors—such as government
officials, national courts, and administrative agencies—and then discuss private
IC interlocutors, including legal experts, businesses, and NGOs. Constituency
support is a key determinant of IC authority. Observers tend to take the
support of constituencies for granted when such support exists. In practice, it is
the lack of support that constrains IC authority. Variation that is rooted in the
constituencies themselves thus provides an implicit aid or hurdle to creating and
building IC authority.
1. Key Constituencies
Executive branches. Some scholars expect that ICs will garner narrow and
62
intermediate authority by catering to the interests of executive branches. It is
certainly more difficult for ICs to gain narrow authority when litigating
governments strongly contest IC rulings. An IC’s disagreement with
governments, however, is not always a problem. Executive officials sometimes
dislike existing domestic laws or policies and thus may welcome IC rulings that
order the end of those practices. The executive may also welcome losing a case
when it can blame the court for disappointing domestic interest groups. Even
when governments oppose a legal loss, an IC with extensive authority—and the
support it thus enjoys from a wide audience—may make it more costly for
executive officials to ignore or contest the ruling. Gathii makes this point,
explaining that “human rights activists bring cases before the EACJ not
necessarily or merely to get compliance, but to name and shame their
63
governments for the alleged violations.” Whether the executive accepts
adverse legal outcomes can vary by type of government, by issue area, by a
court’s years of operation, and over time. This suggests that observers should
pay careful attention to case-specific factors that explain variations in officials’
interests in IC rulings. Vinjamuri makes this point as she assesses the changing
64
interest of governments after they self-refer cases to the ICC.
National courts are another key constituency for ICs. National judges
interact with their international colleagues in multiple ways, including by
referring cases to ECJ-style tribunals and by applying international law as
interpreted by ICs in domestic litigation. Gaining support from national judges

62. Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies,
“Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 280 (2011); Eric A. Posner &
John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2005).
63. Gathii, supra note 27, at 61.
64. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 280–83.
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may help ICs achieve intermediate authority by mobilizing compliance partners
even when executive branch officials or legislators reject specific international
rulings.
Extensive authority can be achieved only when IC jurisprudence is
internalized by domestic legal constituencies—including national judges. As a
formal matter, national judges may be obligated to refer certain cases or to
apply international law as interpreted by an IC. When national judges
habitually refer cases and apply IC rulings in these ways, it is tempting to
assume that extensive authority exists. As we explained in part I, however,
issues of hierarchy and legal culture complicate relations between international
and national judges—in particular, the revision or displacement of existing legal
practices. The more open national judiciaries are to such changes, the greater
the likelihood that an IC can successfully establish intermediate and extensive
authority.
This insight is reflected in several contributions to this issue. For example,
Dickerson finds uneven awareness of OHADA law and the OHADA Court
65
among national judges. More consistent awareness may be a precondition to
changing domestic practices in commercial law disputes. Huneeus finds that
national judges in “neoconstitutional” legal systems are more likely to
recognize the IACtHR’s authority to interpret legal norms common to human
rights treaties and national constitutions than judges in other Latin American
66
countries. Kelemen explores another variation, highlighting the impediments
to judiciaries in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania serving as “Union courts”
even as national judges in long-standing EU member states have readily
67
accepted that role.
National administrative agencies can also be an important constituency for
ICs, especially when other national actors resist or ignore IC rulings. Certain
conditions must be in place, however, for IC rulings to resonate with agency
officials.
When administrators gain personally from violating the law—by accepting
bribes or granting personal favors, for example—they have little reason to pay
attention to IC decisions, making it all but impossible for the IC to gain narrow
68
or intermediate authority. Administrators’ willingness to act outside the law
also provides a ready alternative to international litigation. When, in contrast,
administrative agencies operate as professionalized technical bodies, ICs may
build narrow and intermediate authority by validating agency interpretations of
the law and by providing cover when administrative decisions disappoint
influential clients. ICs can also build intermediate authority by filling gaps in
legal texts and by addressing the practical problems that agency officials face.
65. Dickerson, supra note 35, at 79
66. Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 187–201, 205–06.
67. Kelemen, supra note 33, at 136.
68. See, e.g., Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 24 (discussing the relationship between
domestic administrative agencies and the ATJ).
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Legal experts, including practicing lawyers and legal academics, are often
central to the development of IC authority. These actors are generally less
constrained, both legally and politically, than government officials, national
judges, and agency administrators. Practitioners are also formally shielded by
canons of professional responsibility and might benefit regardless of which
69
party prevails in a particular suit.
Narrow or intermediate authority is often associated with a handful of legal
practitioners who are frequent judicial interlocutors. In a number of instances,
these institutional insiders helped to create or previously worked for the court
before which they now appear, or they have professional connections to judges
70
from participating in conferences and law teaching. In this symposium, Caserta
and Madsen explain how this insider story was critical for the CCJ to gain
71
narrow authority in its early original jurisdiction cases.
When ICs become busier, they tend to generate a specialized bar of repeat
players with field-specific knowledge who provide advice to governments,
businesses, and private litigants. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig observe that the WTO
Appellate Body rapidly gained extensive authority in large part due to the
72
support of trade law experts. Conversely, Vinjamuri observes that although
the ICC appears to enjoy extensive authority within the community of
international criminal law experts, it still struggles to gain a basic requisite of
narrow authority—custody over indicted defendants—in many high-profile
73
cases.
Civil society groups, which range from public interest NGOs to industry
associations, are also important contributors to the enlargement of IC authority.
Public interest NGOs often file test cases—especially before human rights
tribunals—that invite international judges broadly to interpret treaty texts or to
74
expand principles only hinted at in earlier rulings. Such groups also monitor
suits filed by private litigants, often requesting leave to file amicus briefs that
amplify legal arguments or the practical consequences of alternative rulings.
NGOs also serve as nodes for coordinating medium- and long-term litigation
69. Mikael Rask Madsen, Reflexivity and the Construction of the International Object: The Case of
Human Rights, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 259, 269–71 (2011).
70. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-Law
Associations in European Integration (1953–1975) (2009), in THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL
POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 63, 63–89 (2009); Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, The ECHR and the Birth
of (European) Human Rights Law as an Academic Discipline, in LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN
LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 117, 117–35 (Bruno de Witte & Antoine Vauchez eds.,
2013); Antoine Vauchez, Introduction. Euro-lawyering, Transnational Social Fields and European
Polity-Building, in LAWYERING EUROPE 1, 1–28 (Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte eds., 2013).
71. See Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28, at 103–14.
72. Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 243–47.
73. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 281.
74. A concrete example is the Essex Human Rights Centre, which is one of the most active human
rights law offices in Europe, especially with regard to Kurdish cases before the ECtHR. Rachel
Cichowski, Civil Society and the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 77, 86 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds.,
2011).
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strategies among litigants, attorneys, and sympathetic government officials who
share similar interests and objectives.
In this symposium, Gathii finds that the EACJ is forging connections with
75
human rights bar associations and civil society groups, and Huneeus discusses
76
links between the IACtHR and neoconstitutionalist lawyers. NGO advocacy
can be a double-edged sword, however. Bold international decisions that
endorse civil society arguments can build a profile among potential
complainants, but they may also engender opposition from government officials
and national judges who oppose such expansive rulings. A stark example,
discussed by Huneeus, is Venezuela’s 2013 withdrawal from the American
77
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.
Whether businesses and firms contribute to building IC authority often
depends upon cost-benefit calculations that weigh the risks of litigation against
the risks of other dispute resolution options. Some ICs grant direct access to
business actors to challenge violations of international economic law, but many
ICs do not. Even when such access exists, firms engaged in transborder
transactions are often deeply dependent on the cooperation of customs, tax
agents, and other government officials, whom they therefore may be reluctant
to sue even for flagrant violations of the law. As Caserta and Madsen explain,
many private companies fear that they will face retaliation by Caribbean states
78
in which they seek to do business if they file suits before the CCJ. In this
environment, personal connections, negotiations, and other modes of dispute
resolution are often far less risky.
2. Constituencies and the Expansion of Authority
ICs gain de facto authority through the iterative process of issuing decisions
that key audiences recognize and respond to with consequential steps toward
79
compliance. The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that the divergent
interests of various IC constituencies may persist even if IC rulings are logically
consistent and legally persuasive. These divergent interests suggest that there
are multiple pathways for ICs to gain authority in fact. Some tribunals acquire
intermediate legal authority when an entrepreneurial law firm or NGO decides
to test the waters. For example, filing a complaint that triggers copy-cat cases
may help a court develop its jurisprudence and connect with additional
interlocutors. For other ICs, a pent-up demand for adjudication leads to a large
number of early suits that create both opportunities and risks for international
80
judges. For still other courts, complaints or referrals may come in fits and
75. Gathii, supra note 27, at 38, 43 n. 50.
76. See generally Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39.
77. Id. at 197–201.
78. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28 at 102.
79. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2447–48 (1991) (discussing
how the ECJ built its authority incrementally through its interactions with national judges, government
officials, and private litigants).
80. This pattern exists in the Andean Community legal system. See Helfer & Alter, supra note 32,
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starts until the judges develop relationships with the relevant constituencies.
Even in the best-case scenario, it takes time for different constituencies to
view ICs as viable venues for adjudicating their claims. It should thus come as
no surprise that newer ICs often have a harder time gaining narrow and
intermediate authority compared to ICs where litigants can refer to past
practices as they decide which suits to pursue. There is, however, one way in
which today’s nascent ICs may be advantaged compared to their predecessors.
Older ICs generally operated in an informational vacuum and had to invent
legal subject areas. Recently established courts, in contrast, can sometimes draw
upon preexisting practices to more quickly establish their own de facto
authority. In this symposium, Levi, Hagan, and Dezalay describe how the
prosecutors for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
drew inspiration from, yet expanded beyond, the prosecutorial strategies used
81
during the Nuremburg trials. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig find that the GATT
dispute settlement panels, despite facing many obstacles, over time created a
body of legal interpretations that aided the WTO Appellate Body in quickly
82
establishing extensive authority. These examples illustrate a more general
point: it should be easier for ICs to gain authority when legal subject areas are
well developed because potential litigants and other interlocutors predate the
court’s creation. Vinjamuri’s analysis, however, raises the cautionary point that
mercurial government interests can impede criminal courts because
international prosecutors depend on state support, which, when given, may
83
anger and undermine the ICC’s authority vis-à-vis other states.
C. Global, Regional, and Domestic Political Contexts
This section considers how different political contexts help or hinder the
creation and evolution of IC legal authority. Rulings that reinforce
contemporary global, regional, and local political trends facilitate ICs in
establishing and expanding narrow, intermediate, and extensive legal authority.
But global, regional, and national political forces may push in different
directions; IC decisions that reinforce one trend may generate opposition
elsewhere that undermines the court’s authority in fact. The risks of running
counter to global, regional, or local trends exist even when ICs apply the law as
written, although the risks may be higher when ICs engage in expansionist
lawmaking.
1. Geopolitics and International Politics
Geopolitical trends and practices produce global frameworks of power and
ideas, which in turn influence and enable actions in international institutions
at 8–11.
81. Ron Levi, John Hagan & Sara Dezalay, International Courts in Atypical Political
Environments: The Interplay of Prosecutorial Strategy, Evidence, and Court Authority in International
Criminal Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 306.
82. Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 261.
83. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 283–86.
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and in regional and national settings. For example, when multilateral
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
demand structural economic reforms, or when American and European donors
link market access and financial assistance to the adoption of neoliberal
economic policies or to the protection of individual liberties, ICs tasked with
84
enforcing free market and human rights rules gain tacit allies. Even if
international institutions and foreign donors do not expressly demand that
states comply with IC rulings, the public nature of court decisions means that a
government’s implementation of those decisions sends a signal about the extent
of its commitment to the institution’s or donor’s goals. As a result, even if
powerful external actors do not push states to comply with IC judgments, courts
that reinforce the objectives of these actors may more easily generate narrow,
intermediate, and extensive legal authority.
Synergy with powerful external actors can be a double-edged sword,
however. Support for the post–Cold War objectives of economic liberalism and
human rights have soured in much of the developing world. To the extent that
ICs enforce rules that reflect externally supported goals that local audiences do
not share, it may be difficult for the IC to acquire narrow and intermediate
authority. This disjuncture between external and internal goals partly explains,
for example, the demise of the Southern African Development Community
85
Tribunal.
2. Regional Integration Politics
Regionalism can help to mediate the pathologies created by disjunctures
between global and local interests. Regional ICs too, even those modeled on
courts in Europe, can sometimes provide a middle ground that both
accommodates local laws and policies and diffuses foreign pressure. An
example is the IP regime of the Andean Community, a regional integration
project among four countries in South America. As is the case for most
developing countries, Andean governments have faced significant external
pressure to protect the IP rights of foreign businesses. The ATJ acted as a
bulwark to uphold a distinctive Andean approach to IP and enabled domestic
administrative agencies to push back against national governments that had
caved to external pressure for stronger IP protection. The ATJ achieved narrow
authority when the agencies complied with its rulings. This case-specific
84. See, e.g., Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 7–8 (discussing expansion of the ATJ’s
de jure authority following structural economic reforms in South America).
85. See Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. RTS.
Q. 870, 891 (2013) (contrasting the pro-democracy, pro-human-rights rhetoric adopted to garner favor
with foreign donors with the pro-sovereignty preferences of political leaders in Southern Africa). Alter,
Helfer, and Gathii further explain how Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe drew on his status as the
country’s liberator and on anti-Western rhetoric to deter other political leaders in the region from
opposing his attacks on the SADC Tribunal. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & James Thuo
Gathii, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Implications for
Theories of Judicial Independence, (iCourts Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21; Duke Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 2015-19, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591837.
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compliance, in turn, laid the groundwork for building intermediate and
86
extensive authority in the specialized field of Andean IP law.
Regional politics are also relevant to ICs operating in the human rights and
criminal law issue areas. Moravcsik, for example, attributes the success of the
ECtHR to the social and political interests of member states in protecting
87
liberal democracy in the context of the Cold War. Madsen generally concurs,
and observes that changes in regional (geo)politics in the post–Cold War era
are creating new challenges—and opportunities—for the ECtHR.
In Africa, many political leaders have attacked the ICC for unfairly
targeting international crimes on that continent. Kenyan President Uhuru
Kenyatta is a leading champion of this charge, which many see as linked to his
88
own, now-successful efforts to avoid prosecution. Yet Africa also has high89
profile ICC champions, including anti-apartheid activist Desmond Tutu. As
Vinjamuri discusses, the regional battle over prosecutions is making it harder
90
for the ICC prosecutor to garner support for arresting defendants. Without
such support, prosecutions—and narrow authority—remain elusive.
3. Domestic Politics
Shifts in domestic politics interact with the geopolitical and regional
contexts to influence IC authority. ICs that find fault with the actions of
repressive regimes may endure a prolonged absence of narrow authority in the
hope that a future government will repudiate the repressive practices of its
predecessor. Courts that operate in these transitional circumstances may have
little authority in fact for an extended period, but may then see a rapid
expansion from narrow, to intermediate, to extensive authority when a new
democratic government triggers a virtuous circle of sympathetic officials,
impassioned attorneys, and a surfeit of claims focusing on violations
91
attributable to a government no longer in power. A notable example is the
rapid expansion of the IACtHR’s authority following the collapse of military
92
regimes in Latin America. Similarly, Madsen observes that once France and
the United Kingdom ended their decolonization struggles, accepting the
93
ECtHR’s oversight became politically easier.
86. Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 3–4.
87. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 220 (2000).
88. See African Union accuses ICC of ‘hunting’ Africans, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22681894.
89. See Desmond Tutu, In Africa Seeking a License to Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/opinion/in-africa-seeking-a-license-to-kill.html?_r=0.
90. Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 283–86.
91. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011) (discussing the global spread of
prosecutions for international crimes and violations of human rights, in part in response to IC rulings).
92. See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 66–95 (2014).
93. Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal
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At other times, however, domestic legal and social forces may provoke a
backlash against ICs. Huneeus discusses Venezuela’s opposition to IACtHR
94
judgments against the policies of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. In
Russia, President Putin has challenged ECtHR rulings condemning violations
of LGBT rights to advance a broader “Eurasia” political strategy that includes
95
appealing to nationalists and conservatives whose oppose such rights.
Political leaders in Africa and the Caribbean have also sought to bolster
their domestic political support by enacting draconian criminal penalties for
96
consensual same-sex conduct and LGBT advocacy. Heated domestic politics
create challenges for ICs, such as the challenges to anti-gay laws filed before the
97
CCJ and the EACJ. International judges who uphold anti-gay laws risk
opprobrium from human rights NGOs and American and European
governments. But ICs that rule against laws at odds with deeply held local
values may see prolonged noncompliance and risk a retrenchment of their
authority in fact.
D. How International Judges Influence Contexts
This symposium primarily explores how institutional and political factors
exogenous to judicial decisionmaking affect IC authority. Yet the judges who
serve on ICs often recognize the importance of these factors for establishing,
expanding, or defending their court’s authority, and they take steps—both
inside and outside the courtroom—to influence the contexts in which their court
operates.
Several articles in this symposium identify examples of international judges
who have attempted to alter or strategically manipulate the contexts in which
they operate. Kelemen and Madsen explain how Europe’s supranational courts
consciously sought to expand their authority during their constitutional
98
founding periods. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig discuss how the WTO Appellate
Body encouraged the development of an international trade bar by accepting
amicus briefs and by allowing private lawyers to participate in WTO
99
proceedings. Huneeus describes the IACtHR’s adoption of “conventionality
Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN
LAW AND POLITICS 43, 51–54 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011).
94. Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 199–201.
95. Timothy Snyder, Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (Mar. 1, 2014,
11:15 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda.
96. Somini Sengupta, Antigay Laws Gain Global Attention; Countering Them Remains Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/africa/antigay-laws-gain-globalattention-countering-them-remains-challenge.html?_r=0.
97. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28, at 113 (discussing challenges to anti-gay immigration laws in
Belize and Trinidad); Press Statement, Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights and Constitutional
Law, Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act Challenged Before the East African Court of Justice (Apr. 25,
2014), http://www.hrapf.org/sites/default/files/publications/14_04_23_cschrcl_press_release_upon_eacj_
reference_filing_final.pdf.
98. Kelemen, supra note 33, at 138; Madsen, supra note 33, at 167.
99. Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 254–55.
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control” to induce national judges to follow Inter-American jurisprudence.
Caserta and Madsen discuss the extrajudicial strategies CCJ judges employed to
101
connect with new audiences and encourage the filing of cases. Gathii
considers how EACJ judges maintained close connections with regional bar
102
associations. Hagan, Levi, and Dezalay show how prosecutorial strategies for
aligning with key constituencies were developed at the Nuremberg Tribunal
103
and the ICTY. And Vinjamuri examines prosecutorial choices that elate one
104
audience while simultaneously raising suspicion among other audiences.
These examples illustrate that international judges can sometimes impact
the context in which ICs operate. Yet there are significant limits to what judges
can accomplish. No doctrinal innovation can alter the fact that only states can
litigate before the WTO Appellate Body. Similarly, IACtHR judges can urge
their domestic colleagues to apply Inter-American human rights norms, but
105
some national judges will inevitably resist. And some contextual factors that
impede IC authority are so deeply entrenched that judges can do little about
them, as Dickerson explains in stressing the irrelevance of the OHADA Court
106
and OHADA law to the informal economy in Francophone Africa. That said,
international judges who understand the multiple contexts in which ICs operate
are likely to be more effective in harnessing support for their respective
107
institutions, as Madsen’s discussion of the ECtHR’s “legal diplomacy” reveals.
E. The Contextual Factors Investigated in This Symposium
The contributors to this symposium explore how contextual factors
influence the creation, growth, functioning, or diminution of IC authority by
making comparisons across contexts. Table 2 provides a snapshot of their
findings and related insights. It also serves as a guide for readers interested in
looking across the symposium to explore how a particular contextual factor may
or may not shape IC authority.

100. Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 203 (quoting Almonacid Arellano and
others v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006)).
101. Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28 at 108–14.
102. Gathii, supra note 27, at 38.
103. Levi, Hagan & Dezalay, supra note 81, at 295, 301.
104. See generally Vinjamuri, supra note 35.
105. Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts, supra note 19.
106. Dickerson, supra note 35, at 68.
107. See generally Madsen, supra note 33.
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Table 2: Contextual Factors Explored in This Symposium

Contextual Factors

Comparisons Explored for Different ICs

WTO DS—GATT consent-based vs. WTO compulsory jurisdiction
ICC—Self-referral vs. Security Council referral
IC design features

CCJ—Appellate jurisdiction replacing Privy Council vs. CARICOM original
jurisdiction
International criminal tribunals—Documentary strategy vs. witness-based
strategy
ECtHR—Optional vs. compulsory jurisdiction

ICJ—Informal dispute settlement by Islamic law states
WTO DS—Dispute settlement under regional and bilateral trade agreements
Alternatives to
litigation

EACJ—Domestic political and legal alternatives
OHADA—Informal norms
CCJ—Political channels

EACJ—Economic disputes vs. human rights disputes
Varying subject
matter

ICJ—Diplomatic immunity vs. territorial disputes
CCJ—Criminal law and human rights vs. economic disputes

Varying domestic
audiences

IACtHR—Neoconstitutionalist countries (e.g., Colombia and Chile) vs.
leftist states (e.g., Venezuela)
EACJ—Economic actors vs. human rights NGOs
OHADA—Formal vs. informal economy
ECJ and ECtHR—Old vs. new member states; established democracies vs.
post-communist democracies

ECJ—Cold War vs. post–Cold War setting
CCJ—Privy Council (post-colonial) vs. CARICOM (neoliberal)
Varying geopolitical
contexts

WTO DS—Cold War vs. post–Cold War; rise of China
ECtHR—Cold War vs. post–Cold War
International criminal tribunals—Post–WWII occupation vs. post–Cold War
period

31
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V
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IC AUTHORITY AND IC POWER
Our framework analyzes different categories of IC authority by reference to
the practices of different audiences. As we have explained, we are chiefly
interested in variation and change in these categories across ICs, issue areas,
and time. Authority in fact, however, corresponds only roughly to whether an
IC is powerful. For example, a court may have de facto authority in some of the
disputes that it adjudicates but still not be a politically powerful institution
because many legal violations are never brought to court or are the subject of
rulings that are ignored.
Powerful ICs, in contrast, have authority in fact that extends across a broad
range of issues, states, and types of cases. For any legal issue, a change from
narrow to intermediate to extensive authority expands the court’s power,
defined as the ability to move governments and private actors in the direction
108
indicated by the law. Yet this observation, and our framework overall, equates
ICs that have extensive authority over a broad array of actors and disputes—
such as the ECJ and ECtHR in EU and human rights law—with ICs that have
extensive authority vis-à-vis only a few actors or technical issues—such as the
OHADA Court in some commercial disputes or the ATJ in IP cases.
We view the scalability of our framework as an advantage for the study of
ICs, whose authority in fact is often less extensive than their formal delegated
authority. We recognize, however, that an IC that has extensive authority is not
the same as a court that casts a large shadow over law and politics. To capture
variation in IC power, we introduce a third dimension: the extent to which a
court has narrow, intermediate, or extensive authority over a broad subject
matter jurisdiction and many state parties.
Figure 2 captures this third dimension by adding height to the circles of IC
authority displayed in figure 1 above. The white cone corresponds to the white
circles of figure 1, representing the IC’s formally delegated jurisdiction. The
greater the height of the white cone, the broader its base and the more
expansive the court’s formally delegated authority. For an IC with no de facto
authority, the white cone would remain a blank space. ICs with some authority
in fact would be represented by a shaded cone nested inside the white cone.
Figure 2 offers the key insight that the size of the shaded cone varies along
two dimensions—width and height—each of which can change independently of
the other. The width of the shaded cone indicates whether an IC has narrow,
intermediate, or extensive authority for a specific set of legal issues, such as
diplomatic immunity disputes or cases involving state violence. A larger shaded
cone suggests that more audiences recognize an IC’s authority for a specific set
of issues and cases. To make the diagram more readable, the cone uses uniform
shading to reflect extensive IC authority. The cone replicates figure 1 at the top
108. Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 464, 466.
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of the large shaded cone, to demonstrate that figure 1 is a slice of the cone.
The height of the shaded cone shows the expansiveness of the jurisdiction
that an IC actually exercises. The taller the shaded cone, the more powerful the
IC. Because ICs seldom exercise the entire jurisdiction that states formally
delegate to them, the shaded cone is depicted as smaller than the white cone.
However, an IC might use judicial lawmaking to expand its own jurisdiction to
the point that the shaded cone grows taller than the white cone.
To illustrate variations of IC power, figure 2 includes three differently sized
shaded cones that show three different ICs, each of which has extensive
authority. The expansiveness of each court’s jurisdiction varies, with the result
that each court’s influence also varies.
The small cone “A” at the bottom of the diagram depicts an IC with
extensive authority over the entire zone of its delegated jurisdiction. Yet
because that jurisdiction is limited, the court has minimal power. An example is
the Arab Investment Court, an IC whose jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
nonimplementation of arbitral awards in disputes between Arab League states
and firms. Even if the court develops narrow, intermediate, and extensive
authority across its entire subject matter competence and all actors who have or
109
might litigate disputes, it would still have very limited political influence.

109. See generally Walid Ben Hamida, The First Arab Investment Court Decision, 7 J. WORLD
INVEST. & TRADE 699 (2006) (discussing the Arab Investment Court).
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Figure 2: The Relationship of IC Authority to IC Power

An IC can also be minimally powerful if its extensive authority is confined
to a small fraction of a broader delegated jurisdiction. Cone “B” in the middle
of figure 2 shows an IC with narrow, intermediate and extensive authority
limited to an island within a wider subject matter jurisdiction. A good example
of this is the ATJ in IP cases. Another type of island exists, as Huneeus’
discussion of the Inter-American system reveals, when only some of the
countries that have signed on to an IC’s jurisdiction recognize its intermediate
and extensive authority.
In contrast, the larger shaded cone “C” represents an IC that has extensive
authority extending over a wide-ranging subject matter and that encompasses
all or most of its member states. The combination of extensive authority and
expansive jurisdiction makes such a court both politically influential and
effective. The ECJ and the ECtHR are examples of such courts.
We drew these cones as monoliths. But our theory of authority allows for an
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IC to have extensive authority over some issues, audiences, and countries and
no authority over others that fall within the court’s formal authority. In reality,
IC authority may thus resemble Swiss cheese. Vinjamuri’s contribution to this
symposium, for example, identifies the absence of IC narrow authority for
110
certain types of cases and audiences. The larger and more numerous the holes,
the less the overall volume of IC authority and power.
The third dimension of IC authority in figure 2 suggests that for an IC to
become politically powerful it must: (1) have a formal or self-created
jurisdiction that extends over multiple politically consequential issue areas, (2)
exercise de facto authority that extends across the breadth of this jurisdiction,
(3) extend this authority to at least intermediate and preferably also extensive
authority, and (4) have few gaps in de facto authority. This topic merits further
study.
VI
CONCLUSION: THE AUTHORITY OF ICS IN A COMPLEX WORLD
This introduction has provided a comprehensive framework for analyzing
and empirically assessing the de facto authority of ICs. The judicial nature of
ICs makes them a distinct type of international institution. The formal power
that states delegate to ICs establishes, as a legal matter, their right to rule. Yet
because ICs operate in a context of regime complexity, in which there are
competing and overlapping decisionmakers that lack an accepted hierarchy,
turning that formal mandate into de facto authority raises political, legal, and
practical challenges.
We developed metrics to evaluate empirically whether ICs have narrow,
intermediate, or extensive legal authority. According to our definition, ICs have
authority when the litigants (narrow authority), the court’s compliance partners
(intermediate authority), and the legal field (extensive authority) recognize the
binding nature of IC rulings and undertake meaningful steps to give effect to
those rulings. The symposium’s contributors apply these metrics to ten different
ICs spanning economic, human rights, and mass atrocities issue areas, exploring
how contextual factors shape an IC’s de facto authority. Important contextual
factors include the availability of litigation alternatives, the discretionary
decisions of prosecutors, the openness of domestic lawyers and judges to IC
litigation, the compatibility of international and domestic laws and legal
practices, and the geopolitics of the time. Some of these factors can be
influenced by international judges, but many cannot.
Finally, we examined the relationship between IC authority and IC power.
Although authority is a form of power and the means through which ICs
become powerful institutional actors, our investigation of varied IC authority
demonstrates that the two concepts are in fact distinct. We conceive of a
politically powerful IC as one that has attained narrow, intermediate, and
110. See generally Vinjamuri, supra note 35.
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extensive authority that encompasses a wide range of politically salient topics
across its membership. Some of the ICs in this symposium have attained this
level of influence. Others have narrow, intermediate, or even extensive
authority, yet they nonetheless remain marginal political actors for some legal
issues, or in some member states, or both. The contributors show, however, that
even where an IC’s authority is circumscribed, it sometimes exerts influence
over specific issue areas.
A key theoretical benefit of our framework and this symposium is the
conception of IC authority as varying by audience. This recognition surmounts
a number of artificial binaries that commentators impose when they focus on
only one IC or on only one audience.
First, we challenge the binary claim that ICs either do or do not have
authority. The contributors to this issue provide many examples of audiences
and interlocutors differing in their embrace of IC rulings. This means that the
support of the litigating parties—which may include a single lawyer, activist
NGO, or sympathetic government—although necessary and sufficient to confer
narrow authority in the case at hand—is not sufficient for an IC to gain
intermediate or extensive authority. Conversely, opposition to an IC ruling by a
single actor does not in itself signify that a court lacks any authority in fact.
A second erroneous binary is the idea that legal authority resides either at
the international or at the national level. By design, ICs exercise their legal
authority in tandem with domestic actors, whether in a complementary or a
contested fashion. Domestic actors who recognize an obligation to comply with
IC rulings and engage in meaningful practices toward that end affirm IC
authority without necessarily diminishing their own authority.
Our separation of authority and legitimacy renders a third binary
unsustainable. In particular, we contest the claim that an IC is either
authoritative and legitimate on the one hand, or illegitimate and thus
unauthoritative on the other. Longstanding debates about the compatibility of
democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, and international judicial review have
gained traction precisely because neither de jure nor de facto legal authority is
the same as legitimacy.
Finally, our framework suggests a strategy through which ICs can become
politically influential institutions. International judges and their supporters
should look beyond narrow authority and look outside the courtroom to build
support among future compliance partners and the larger legal field. This
further implies that it is not enough for international judges to focus on
delivering high-quality legal rulings. Nor should international judges be satisfied
once a legal ruling garners compliance. Building and maintaining IC authority
remains a collective and fragile enterprise, one that is shaped by a range of
contextual factors and requires the ongoing care and attention of a wide range
of actors.

